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SUBJECT: KREMLIN KEEPS AMB ROGOZIN ON A SHORT LEASH IN HIS  
NRC DEBUT

Classified By: Ambassador Victoria Nuland for reasons 1.4 (b), (d)

11. (C) SUMMARY: Russian nationalist politician-turned-diplomat Dmitri Rogozin launched into a lengthy litany of Russian grievances on missile defense (MD), NATO enlargement, CFE, and Kosovo at his first NATO-Russia Council meeting on January 30, albeit in a more measured tone than in his recent press interviews. Rogozin emphasized that he represented President Putin, not the Russian MFA, and had just met with Putin (although we later heard his opening intervention was written word for word by the MFA). In an oblique reference to the threat posed by Iran, Rogozin acknowledged that North America and Europe are threatened on the "southern flank" but pointed out that Russia is as well and that Russia's views on that threat should be given greater weight by Allies. He encouraged a joint NATO-Russia missile defense response to counter the threat in place of the current U.S. and NATO MD plans, which could force Russia to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF). He blamed Allies for not ratifying the Adapted CFE, but did NOT/NOT call for a new treaty to include naval assets as he had in recent press statements. Rogozin proposed increased NRC cooperation on Afghanistan, counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism, emergency response to ecological disasters, and public diplomacy. Ambassador Nuland and Allies characterized the Parallel Action Plan as the solution to the CFE standoff and pushed back on his assertions on Kosovo. Nuland said Russia's acknowledgment of the ballistic missile threat we share could be the first step towards joint MD cooperation. END SUMMARY.

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MD: COMMON THREAT FROM THE "SOUTHERN FLANK"  
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12. (C) During his address to the NRC, Rogozin praised the NRC for proving its worth last year with the missile defense consultations. He said the NRC should continue this work to address disagreements over the U.S. Third Site and NATO Active Layered Ballistic Missile Defense program (ALTBMD). While acknowledging Allied concerns about the threat from the "southern flanks" -- a reference to Iran and possibly Pakistan -- Rogozin said that Russia was even closer to the threat and that therefore its evaluation of the extent of the danger should be given more weight. He said the U.S., NATO, and Russia should have a common MD program. Ambassador

Nuland said our common acknowledgment of the threat from the "southern flank" could serve as the foundation for cooperation. She challenged her counterparts to use the Bucharest Summit to initiate work to link U.S., NATO, and Russian radars in a network to protect all of our peoples. In his second intervention, Rogozin said President Putin is ready to cooperate on a common MD umbrella but cautioned that "all the treaties are interconnected." He elaborated that if the U.S. and NATO proceed unabated with their plans -- rather than with development of a unified system that includes Russia -- this could undermine the INF Treaty. (NOTE: After the meeting, Russian Political Counselor Kochukov told us that pulling out of the INF is seriously under consideration by Putin. END NOTE.)

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NATO ENLARGEMENT: SHOW US A LITTLE "RESPECT"  
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13. (C) Rogozin stressed that any movement towards "NATO expansion" to Ukraine or Georgia at the Bucharest Summit would negatively impact NATO's relations with Russia. The Ukrainian public, argued Rogozin, is not ready for MAP, especially in the south and east. He said the mood in Ukraine is against enlargement, and that forcing MAP through could be a threat to the very existence of Ukraine as a sovereign state. On Georgia, Rogozin said MAP could shatter the "fragile peace brokered by the Russian Federation." He said Russia would be undergoing a transition of power during the Bucharest Summit; if NATO wants good relations with the new President, it should treat Russia with respect. Enlargement would raise tension along the borders between NATO and Russia, according to Rogozin. The UK and Hungary challenged this assertion. Hungary said NATO was the only

Alliance it voluntarily joined in its history, and its membership had not diminished anyone else's security.

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CFE AND KOSOVO: STICKING TO THE KREMLIN LINE  
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14. (C) Rogozin said the survival of the CFE regime is "in the hands of our Western partners." He railed against the Treaty for limiting Russian military movements on its own territory, explaining that the United States would never agree to such limitations on military movements "from Arizona to Kansas." He noted that Russian public opinion was highly critical of the flank limitations, but once Allies ratify the adapted CFE, it would engender good will with the Russian populace. Allies discounted Rogozin's assessment since Russia had suspended implementation of the Treaty, not the Alliance. Allied Perm Reps -- led by Germany -- voiced steadfast support for the Parallel Action Plan as the sole path to resolve this crisis. Rogozin did not call for a new treaty or insist the naval assets be included in it as attributed to him in the press prior to the meeting.

15. (C) Rogozin warned that independence by Kosovo would open Pandora's box and would provoke further conflict in the Balkans. Ambassador Nuland strongly refuted this, arguing that Kosovo sets no precedent because of the unique circumstances around the brutal Milosevic invasion and status as a UN protectorate. In a second intervention, Rogozin said the fact that Kosovo needs 20,000 KFOR soldiers highlights why it is not ready for independence. At the same time he admitted that the EU "shares the border" with Kosovo and it is largely the EU's problem to resolve.

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NRC WORK PROGRAM AND PRACTICAL COOPERATION  
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16. (C) Rogozin noted that the NRC Work Program was not adopted last year and called for it to be unblocked. Several Allies politely pointed out that all of the Allies supported U.S. brokered compromise text and Russia was now the sole hold-out. (NOTE: The Russian Mission expects Moscow's

blessing for the work program in the February 5 NRC Preparatory Committee which would allow it to then be noted at the Vilnius Defense Ministerial. END NOTE.)

¶17. (C) Rogozin ran through a laundry list of areas in which Russia wants to strengthen practical cooperation including drug interdiction, counter-terrorism, and emergency response to ecological disasters. He highlighted that Russian support for Afghanistan could include a NATO transit agreement and airlift capacity, but noted cooperation could be made more efficient by working with "the strong union" of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Rogozin tried to link Russian assistance on Afghanistan to completion of a bilateral military transit agreement through Kaliningrad (a bilateral issue with Lithuania).

¶18. (C) Rogozin proposed a conference on counterfeiting of arms and insisted that Russia should be getting royalties on sales of arms from expired Soviet licenses.

¶19. (C) Citing his academic background in journalism, Rogozin pushed for the NRC to do more to influence public opinion. He said a civic forum in Russia could be used to build cooperation and engage the public. Ambassador Nuland expressed satisfaction that Russia was coming around on the idea of a NATO-Russia civil society forum to create more practical value for the public.

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COMMENT  
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¶10. (C) In a prior January 29 meeting, Ambassador Rogozin gave NATO Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer a Russian hatchet to symbolize that NATO and Russia should bury it after the turmoil in 2007. There has been much trepidation within the corridors of NATO about the appointment of the

outspoken nationalist politician as the Russian Ambassador to NATO. The Russian Mission told us after the meeting that Rogozin stuck largely to his MFA talking points, and that Moscow was closely watching his debut. While Rogozin clearly took a step back from his rhetoric to address the NRC in a more measured tone, his lengthy intervention still came off as grandstanding (and a little haughty). He often used the word "respect," clearly implying that both he and Russia deserved a great deal from Allies. He seemed to want to impress the group with his personal expertise on a variety of subjects as well as with his personal relationship with President Putin. END COMMENT.  
NULAND